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Abstract
In component-based systems, two components are behaviorally compatible if all possible
sequences of services requested by one component can be provided by the other component.
Verification of this compatibility is essential if subtle software failures, which are difficult
to detect and correct, are to be eliminated. For verification of compatibility, the behavior
of interacting components, at their interfaces, is modeled by labeled Petri nets with labels
representing the requested and provided services. The paper discusses the verification pro-
cess for several classes of interface languages, with emphasis on the algorithmic aspects of
verification.
1 Introduction
The difficulties and challenges involved in the development of large–scale software systems
are fairly well documented [4, 16] and several strategies have been proposed to address
these difficulties [16, 17]. Concepts related to software architecture [1, 6, 9, 14] are the most
promising attempt to provide the basis of a new set of techniques for the next generation
of software-intensive solutions [2, 3]. Software architecture uses components as the basic
building blocks of software systems.
Components can be considered as the basic functional units and the fundamental data
types in architectural design. Components represent high-level software models; they must
be generic enough to work in a variety of contexts and in cooperation with other compo-
nents, but they also must be specific enough to provide easy reuse [18, 19]. Although there
are a variety of component definitions, they seem to be consistent with respect to the most
characteristic properties of components:
• components are units of independent deployment,
• components are units of third-party composition,
• components have no (externally) observable state.
These properties have several implications. For a component to be independently
deployable, it needs to be well separated from its environment and other components. A
component, therefore, encapsulates its constituent features. Also, as a unit of deployment,
a component will never be deployed partially [19].
For a component to be composable with other (third-party) components, it needs to
be sufficiently self-contained. Also, it needs to come with clear specifications of what
it requires and what it provides. In other words, a component needs to encapsulate its
implementation and interact with its environment by means of well-defined interfaces.
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Finally, a component would not have any (externally) observable state – it is required
that the component cannot be distinguished from copies of itself. Possible exceptions to
this rule are attributes contributing to the component’s functionality, such as serial num-
bers used for accounting. The specific exclusion of observable state allows for permissible
technical uses of state that can be crucial for performance without affecting the observable
behavior of a component [18].
Due to the stateless nature of components, it makes little sense to have multiple copies
of the same component in the same operating system as these would be mutually indistin-
guishable anyway. In many current approaches, components are heavyweight units with
exactly one instance in a system. For example, a database server could be a component
[19].
The interface of a component defines the component’s access points [18]. These points
allow clients of a component to access the services provided by the component. Normally,
a component will have multiple interfaces corresponding to different access points. Each
access point may provide a different service, catering to different client needs.
Two interacting components are compatible if all services that are requested by one
component are provided by the other components. Such “static” compatibility can usually
be checked quite easily, but it does not prevent more subtle errors which are due to some
limitations on the ordering of services. Therefore a “dynamic” (or behavioral) compatibility
is used, and two components are compatible in the behavioral sense if all possible sequences
of services requested by one of the interacting components can be provided by the other
component. This paper discusses algorithmic aspects of the verification of behavioral
compatibility of components which are represented by labeled Petri nets; it is a continuation
of an earlier paper [8] that discussed behavioral compatibility in a conceptual way (with
numerous illustrations in the form of Petri net models).
Section 2 recalls Petri net models of the behavior of components. The concept of com-
patibility and its verification is addressed in Section 3, while Section 4 contains concluding
remarks with some directions for future work.
2 Component models
The behavior of a component, at its interface, can be represented by a labeled Petri net
[7]:
Mi = (Pi, Ti, Ai, Si,mi, ℓi, Fi),
where Pi and Ti are disjoint sets of places and transitions, respectively, Ai is the set of
directed arcs connecting places with transitions and transitions with places, Ai ⊆ Pi×Ti∪
Ti×Pi, Si is an alphabet representing the set of services that are associated with transitions
by the labeling function ℓi : Ti → Si ∪ {ε} (ε is the “empty” service; it labels transitions
which do not represent services), mi is the initial marking function mi : Pi → {0, 1, ...},
and Fi is the set of final markings (which are used to indicate the end of sequences of
firings).
In order to represent component interactions, the interfaces are divided into provider
interfaces (or p-interfaces) and requester interfaces (or r-interfaces). In the context of a
provider interface, a labeled transition can be thought of as a service provided by that
component; in the context of a requester interface, a labeled transition is a request for a
corresponding service. It is required that in each p-interface there is exactly one labeled
transition for each provided service:
∀ti, tj ∈ T : ℓ(ti) = ℓ(tj) ⇒ ti = tj .
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The label assigned to a transition represents a service or some unit of behavior. For
example, the label can represent a conventional procedure or method invocation. It is as-
sumed that if the p-interface requires parameters from the r-interface, then the appropriate
number and types of parameters are delivered by the r-interface. Similarly, it is assumed
that the p-interface provides an appropriate return value, if such a value is required. The
equality of symbols representing component services (provided and requested) implies that
all such requirements are satisfied.
Component behavior is determined by the set of all possible sequences of services
(required or provided by a component) at a particular interface. Such a set of sequences
is called the interface language.
Let F(M) denote the set of firing sequences in M. The interface language of a compo-
nent represented by a labeled Petri net M, L(M), is the set of all labeled firing sequences
of M:
L(M) = {ℓ(σ) | σ ∈ F(M)},
where ℓ(ti1ti2 ...tik) = ℓ(ti1)ℓ(ti2)...ℓ(tik).
3 Component compatibility
Interface languages of interacting components can be used to define the compatibility of
components; a requester component Mi is compatible with a provider component Mj if




Verification of component compatibility depends upon the type of interface languages. If
these languages are regular (in the sense of Chomsky hierarchy [11]), verification can be
performed directly on the languages. If, however, the languages are non-regular, an indirect
approach is needed in which the components are first composed, and then the behavior of
the composition is analyzed. The composition of component models can be performed in
different ways, resulting in composed models with different properties.
3.2 Regular compatibility
If the languages of interacting requester and provider components are regular, checking
the compatibility is relatively straightforward because the compatibility relation can be
expressed as:
L(Mi) ∩ L(Mj) = ∅
where ∅ denotes the empty set, and A is the complement of the set A. Since the class of
regular languages is closed under the operations of complementation and set intersection,
the compatibility can be verified by performing the corresponding operations on finite
automata representing the requester and provider languages. Let Ai = (Σi,S, δi, si,Fi)
be a deterministic finite automaton defining L(Mi), and let Aj = (Σj ,S, δj , sj ,Fj) be a
deterministic finite automaton defining L(Mj). Both automata can be easily derived from
the net models of the components behavior [7]. A product of deterministic finite automata
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is a well–known operation [11], however, since the interface automata can be quite large,
the product operation should be performed in a way that eliminates all inessential pairs
of states (i.e., pairs of states which cannot be reached from the initial state). This can
easily be done, as outlined in the following algorithm which also checks if a final state can
be reached in the product automaton (i.e., if the intersection of languages is empty) and
sets the variable Empty correspondingly (for an ordered pair s = (a, b), the first element,
a, is extracted by the operation first(s), and the second element, b, by second(s); also, the
function append(x,a) returns a sequence x extended by an element a, head(x) returns the
initial element of x, and tail(x) returns the sequence x without its initial element; sequences
are denoted by angle brackets “〈” and “〉”):
Empty := yes;
States := {(si, sj)};
New := 〈(si, sj)〉;
while New 6= 〈〉 do
s := head(New);
New := tail(New);
for each a in S do
s′ := (δi(first(s), a), δj(second(s), a));
if s′ /∈ States then
States := States ∪ {s′};
New := append(New, s′);




If the variable Empty remains set to yes after the termination of this algorithm,
the compatibility relation is satisfied, and all sequences of services requested by Mi are
provided by Mj .
3.3 Non-regular compatibility
It is known that Petri net languages include all regular languages as well as some context-
free languages and even context-sensitive languages [13]. For non-regular languages the
approach outlined earlier cannot be used because the class of context-free languages is
not closed under complementation, so a different approach is needed for verification of
compatibility of components with non-regular behavior.
The compatibility of interacting components can be verified by composing the compo-
nent models into one model and checking the properties of this model. The composition,
however, can be performed in several ways, resulting in models with different properties.
The COSY–style composition [12] uses the fusion of transitions labeled by the same
services (with some additional elements to distinguish repeated requests of the same ser-
vice). The consequence of such an approach is that the composition corresponds to the
intersection of languages of the provider and requester interfaces:
L(Mi) ∩ L(Mj).
The verification of the compatibility is thus checking the equality:
L(Mi) ∩ L(Mj) = L(Mi)
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which is as difficult as the verification of the original compatibility relation.
The idea behind the CORD (compatible or deadlocked) composition [7] is to make the
language of composed interfaces equal to the language of the requester, or to introduce a
deadlock when the requested sequence of services cannot be provided by the other com-
ponent. The verification of the component compatibility is thus equivalent to deadlock
detection in the composed model. The details are given in [7].
There are two basic methods of deadlock detection in Petri nets. If the net is bounded,
reachability analysis can be used for exhaustive exploration of the marking space, with
deadlock detection as a straightforward addition to the exploration procedure (in the fol-
lowing algorithm, the function enable(m) returns the set of transitions enabled by the









if E = ∅ then
Deadlock := Deadlock ∪ {m}
else
for each t in E do
m′ := fire(m, t);
if m′ /∈ Markings then






If the set variable Deadlock remains empty after termination of the algorithm, the
marked net M = (N ,m0) is free from deadlocks, otherwise Deadlock contains all dead
markings which are reachable from m0.
If the composed model is unbounded, or if the space of reachable markings is finite but
unreasonably large, the structural approach can be used.
The structural approach to deadlock detection is based on siphons [10, 13] (in earlier
publications siphons were called deadlocks) which are defined as such subsets of places
Pi ⊆ P , for which:
Inp(Pi) ⊆ Out(Pi),




{t ∈ T | (t, p) ∈ A}, Out(Pi) =
⋃
p∈Pi
{t ∈ T | (p, t) ∈ A}.
The characteristic property of siphons is that once a siphon Pi becomes unmarked
under a marking m (i.e., m assigns zero tokens to all places of Pi), Pi remains unmarked
for all markings reachable from m.
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It can be shown [5] that in a deadlocked net, all unmarked places constitute a siphon.
The siphon-based approach to deadlock detection systematically checks if the net contains
a proper siphon (a siphon is proper if its input set is a subset of its output set) that can
become unmarked by some firing sequence, and if such a siphon is identified, the initial
marking is modified by the firing sequence, and the check continues for the remaining
(marked, proper) siphons until a deadlock is identified, or until no further progress can be
done. Linear programming is used to find the firing sequence that minimizes the number
of tokens in each proper siphon of the analyzed net (if such a sequence exists) [5, 15].
The drawback of this approach is that the number of siphons in net models of interfaces
is often quite large, so, for practical applications, a significant reduction of this number is
needed.
A minimal siphon is usually defined as a siphon which does not contain any other siphon.
Usually, net models contain just a few minimal siphons. However, minimal siphons rarely
determine the deadlocks. Therefore another type of siphons is needed which is known as
basis siphons. Basis siphons are siphons from which all other siphons can be obtained by
the union operation. Minimal siphons are basis siphons, but usually some basis siphons
are not minimal. The number of basis siphons is typically significantly larger than the
number of minimal siphons.
The proposed deadlock detection procedure [7] is a two stage one; first the (hopefully
small) set of minimal siphons is used for checking the deadlock, and when no further
progress can be made using minimal siphons, a switch is made to use basis siphons (since
each deadlock corresponds to one or a union of several unmarked basis siphons). Let SM
be the set of minimal siphons of a marked net M, and let SB be the set of its basis
siphons; deadlock detection is performed by the invocation “deadlock(m0,SM ,SB)” where
the recursive boolean function deadlock is:
function deadlock(m,X, Y ) : boolean;
begin
if enable(m) = ∅ then return true fi;
if X 6= ∅ then
for each x in X do
(v, n) := LPminimize(x,m);
if nonzero(v) ∧ n = 0 ∧ feasible(v,m) then
m′ := m+C× v;
X ′ := marked(X,m′);




if Y 6= ∅ then return deadlock(m,Y, ∅)fi;
return false
end
The function enable(m), as before, returns the set of transition enabled by m. LPmin-
imize is the linear programming procedure which tries to minimize the number of tokens
assigned to the siphon x by the marking m by finding an appropriate firing sequence; it re-
turns a firing vector v (indicating, for each transition, the number of times it occurs in the
firing sequence) and n, the final number of tokens in the siphon x. If v is a nonzero vector
and n = 0 and the firing vector v is feasible at m (i.e., there exists a firing sequence that
begins at m and corresponds to v), then the current siphon becomes unmarked, and the
checking continues for a reduced set of siphons and a modified marking. C is the incidence
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(or connectivity) matrix of the analyzed net, and the function marked(X,m) returns the
set of all those siphons in X which are marked by m. The last section of deadlock performs
the switch from minimal siphons to basis siphons (and continues deadlock detection).
If the function deadlock returns true, the analyzed net contains a deadlock (a simple
modification of the function can provide a firing sequence creating this deadlock); if the
function returns false, the net is deadlock–free.
The linear programming procedure returns a firing vector minimizing the number of
tokens in the analyzed siphon. Such a firing vector may have no implementation in the
form of a firing sequence, i.e., it may be infeasible for a given marking m. Therefore the
feasibility of firing vectors is checked by another recursive (boolean) function:
function feasible (v,m) : boolean;
begin
if zero(v) then return true fi;
for each t in enable(m) do
if v[t] > 0 then
v′ := v;
v′[t] := v′[t]− 1;
m′ := fire(m, t);





If the function returns true, the firing vector v is feasible for markingm; if the returned
value is false, such a firing sequence does not exist, and v is infeasible for m.
4 Concluding Remarks
The strategy described in this paper is an initial, but important step in the continuing evo-
lution of the design and construction of dependable software systems. Establishing a well
defined and formal method for determining the extent to which two or more components
are able to reliably interact can serve to significantly enhance reuse of software components
in a given software architecture. Ultimately, this may contribute to the successful evolution
of a deployed component-based software system.
Although the discussion focused on interactions of two components, more general sce-
narios can be discussed in a similar way; a number of results for systems with multiple
requester and multiple provider components can be found in [7].
The proposed approach can be extended in many ways, for example, temporal charac-
teristics of components can be included into net models and used for performance analysis
[20]. Also, for systems composed of many requester and provider components, an incre-
mental approach would be interesting as it would allow a software architect to “reuse” the
verification steps for subsystems that are not affected by modifications.
An interesting related problem is how to obtain Petri net models of components; would
it be practical to generate such models from component specifications or, perhaps, from
the implementation code?
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